

# Genossenschaftliche FinanzGruppe

# **Key Rating Drivers**

Leading German Retail and Commercial Group: Genossenschaftliche FinanzGruppe's (GFG) ratings reflect the group's leading and highly diversified business profile, strong risk-adjusted capitalisation and low leverage, sound asset quality, a record of profitability that is considerably better than most German peers, as well as its outstanding funding profile, by international standards. GFG's Viability Rating (VR) is one notch above the implied VR, reflecting the high importance for GFG's ratings of its strong business profile.

**Mutual Support Mechanism:** GFG is not a legal entity, but a cooperative banking network whose cohesion is ensured by an institutional protection scheme (IPS) managed by the Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e. V. (BVR). GFG's Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) are group ratings that apply to each member bank, including its central institution DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank and its subsidiaries.

**Diversified Business Model:** GFG's domestically-focused, stable universal banking business model has delivered stable profits over several economic cycles. It is based on its local banks' strong domestic retail and small SME banking franchise supported by DZ BANK's product suppliers. These include domestic market leaders in the insurance, asset-management and realestate businesses. The business model benefits from a strong strategic alignment of DZ BANK and the local banks with intensified cooperation and cross-selling across GFG.

**High Interest-Rate Risk Exposure:** Interest-rate risk is high in the local banks' loan books and securities portfolios due to their asset/liability duration mismatches, a high share of fixed-rate lending, and the absence of widespread use of interest-rate hedging derivatives. This led to high unrealised valuation losses in 2022 in the local banks' securities portfolios. However, Fitch Ratings views the banks' strong deposit franchise, liquidity and earnings as sufficient mitigating factors to prevent a forced sale of securities.

**Sound Asset Quality:** GFG's asset quality remained resilient in 2022, despite macro-economic and geopolitical risks. We expect impaired loans to modestly increase in the next two years, to about 2% of gross loans due to higher interest rates and inflation, which are likely to drive rising insolvencies in the group's SME and commercial real estate portfolios.

Resilient Average Profitability: GFG's profits have been more stable than the German banking sector's historically. Operating profit declined significantly in 2022 due to temporary writedowns in the local banks' securities portfolios and DZ BANK's insurance subsidiary, driven by the sharp increase of interest rates during 2022. We expect profitability to recover in 2023, but to remain below 2021, as loan growth subsides and loan impairment charges normalise upward.

**Strong Capitalisation:** The local banks and DZ BANK are both well-capitalised, and GFG's leverage ratio is high by international standards. We expect GFG's common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio to remain close to the current 15% in the medium term, supported by slower loan growth than in previous years.

Very Stable Funding: The local banks are predominantly funded by granular, mostly price-inelastic domestic retail deposits, and their structurally large excess liquidity covers most of DZ BANK's short-term funding needs. As a frequent issuer of unsecured debt and the largest German covered bond issuer to an established and geographically diversified investor base, DZ BANK provides GFG with reliable access to the wholesale markets.

#### **Ratings**

#### Genossenschaftliche FinanzGruppe

Long-Term IDR AA-Short-Term IDR F1+

Viability Rating aa

Government Support Rating ns

#### Sovereign Risk (Germany)

Long-Term IDR AAA
Country Ceiling AAA

#### Outlooks

Long-Term IDR Stable
Sovereign Long-Term IDR Stable

#### Applicable Criteria

Bank Rating Criteria (September 2022)

#### **Related Research**

Fitch Affirms German Cooperative Banks and DZ BANK at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable (April 2023)

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Rating Report | 9 May 2023 fitchratings.com



# **Rating Sensitivities**

## Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action/Downgrade

We could downgrade GFG's and its members' ratings if GFG's impaired loan ratio durably rises above 3%, its average operating profit/risk-weighted assets (RWAs) ratio declines below 1%, or its regulatory CET1 ratio falls durably below 13%. A downgrade of our operating environment score for GFG (aa-/stable) would also put pressure on its ratings.

## Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action/Upgrade

An upgrade of GFG's and of its members' ratings is unlikely given the already high ratings and in light of the increased economic and financial uncertainties. In addition to a domestic environment that would allow higher lending margins, an upgrade would also require greater cost efficiency, which is likely to necessitate a protracted streamlining of the group's structure, especially at the local banks.



# **Other Debt and Issuer Ratings**

	Rating	
DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank		
Long-term deposit rating <sup>a</sup>	AA	
Short-term deposit rating <sup>a</sup>	F1+	
Long-term senior preferred debt <sup>a, b</sup>	AA	
Short-term senior preferred debt <sup>a, b</sup>	F1+	
Long-term senior non-preferred debt <sup>a</sup>	AA-	
Tier 2 subordinated debt	А	
Additional Tier 1 notes	BBB+(EXP)	
Deutsche Apotheker- und Aerztebank eG		
Long-term deposit rating	AA-	
Short-term deposit rating	F1+	
Muenchener Hypothekenbank eG		
Long-term deposit rating	AA	
Short-term deposit rating	F1+	
Local cooperative banks		
Long-term deposit rating	AA-	
Short-term deposit rating	F1+	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Also applies to DZ BANK's subsidiary DZ HYP AG

Source: Fitch Ratings

The long-term deposit ratings and long-term senior preferred debt ratings of DZ BANK and its banking subsidiaries, DZ BANK's Derivative Counterparty Rating (DCR), and the long-term deposit rating of Muenchener Hypothekenbank are one notch above their respective Long-Term IDRs because of the protection provided by senior non-preferred and more junior debt buffers to preferred creditors.

The deposit ratings of Deutsche Apotheker- und Aerztebank and of the local cooperative banks are aligned with GFG's IDRs due to the absence of sustainable significant senior non-preferred and more junior debt buffers at these entities.

A preferred bail-in resolution strategy with a single-point-of-entry approach is applicable for DZ BANK group, which is directly under the authority of the European Single Resolution Board.


Each local bank is regulated individually as a less significant institution. Consequently, the German regulator's preferred resolution strategy for these banks consists of standard insolvency procedures, and the predominantly deposit-funded local banks have no incentive to build up resolution buffers. Deutsche Apotheker- und Aerztebank and Muenchener Hypothekenbank's preferred resolution strategy also consists of standard insolvency procedures, but Muenchener Hypothekenbank has a very large stock of legacy senior non-preferred debt outstanding, which we expect to remain well in excess of 10% of RWAs.

The ratings of the subordinated Tier 2 and additional Tier 1 notes issued by DZ BANK and its subsidiaries are two and four notches below GFG's VR, respectively, which is the standard notching for this type of instruments under Fitch's criteria. We use the VR as the anchor rating as we believe that GFG, by protecting the viability of DZ BANK and its subsidiaries, increases the likelihood that all due payments on these notes will continue to be met.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>b</sup> Also applies to DZ BANK's subsidiary DZ PRIVATBANK S.A.



# **Ratings Navigator**



The Key Rating Driver (KRD) weightings used to determine the implied VR are shown as percentages at the top. In cases where the implied VR is adjusted upwards or downwards to arrive at the VR, the KRD associated with the adjustment reason is highlighted in red. The shaded areas indicate the benchmark-implied scores for each KRD.

# VR - Adjustments to Key Rating Drivers

The business profile score of 'aa-' is above the 'a' category implied score due to the following adjustment reason: business model (positive).

The earnings and profitability score of 'a' is above the 'bbb' category implied score due to the following adjustment reason: earnings stability (positive).

The capitalisation and leverage score of 'aa-' is above the 'a' category implied score due to the following adjustment reason: leverage and risk-weight calculation (positive).

The funding and liquidity score of 'aa' is above the 'a' category implied score due to the following adjustment reason: deposit structure (positive).



# **Company Summary and Key Qualitative Factors**

#### **Business Profile**

#### **GFG** Is the German Cooperative Banking Group

GFG comprised more than 700 local cooperative banks as of end-1Q23, which focus on retail and small SME banking, and also included their central institution DZ BANK, which also consolidates GFG's banking product suppliers. DZ BANK is large – making up about 35% of GFG's aggregated assets at end-2022 – and more exposed to riskier asset classes such as commercial real estate (CRE) than the local banks are. However, stable and low-risk retail businesses dominate DZ BANK's revenue mix, similar to the local banks.

GFG's domestic market shares are close to 20% in most deposit and loan segments, second only to the savings banks (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe, SFG). Like SFG, GFG is particularly strong in retail and small business banking. It has steadily increased its market shares in most core products over the past decade, gradually reducing the gap with SFG, and still has some potential to improve its penetration of the large German mid-sized SME market. Moreover, about 60% of the group's 30 million clients are also the local banks' owners. This significantly enhances the stability of GFG's client base, as does the local banks' strong commitment to their home regions.

The local banks and DZ BANK's product suppliers have also intensified their cooperation and cross-selling over the past decade, strengthening GFG's cohesion. This is evidenced by a consistently high level of fees paid by the product suppliers owned by DZ BANK to the local banks and the strong intra-group cooperation on digitalisation and IT harmonisation.

In our view, GFG is well equipped to manage the transition of its clients' banking behaviour (notably toward rising acceptance and more extensive use of digital services), while maintaining the local proximity that underpins its franchise. In doing so, the group is helped by the marked inertia that characterises its predominantly older German retail clients, including a fairly slow adoption of digitalisation trends and a high degree of loyalty to long-standing main banking relationships.

Successfully combining GFG's traditional and innovative banking channels, including the development of digital onboarding, is crucial to attract younger customers. GFG aims to diversify its long-term diversify its revenues by leveraging the primary banks' strong ties to their local communities to create local digital platforms offering services beyond traditional banking. We view this as plausible.

#### Decentralised Structure Strengthens Franchise but Complicates Regulation

GFG's local banks collectively own DZ BANK, control its supervisory board, and define its strategic orientations in cooperation with DZ BANK's management. The local banks operate much more autonomously than in most European cooperative banking groups. This is because each local bank is legally independent, with its own management team and supervisory board, and the BVR has limited powers to influence their governance. In our view, this highly decentralised structure results in looser corporate governance at group level compared to a single bank architecture.

We believe that this autonomy and the fact that DZ BANK has no authority over the local banks explain the absence of regulatory requirements at GFG's level, with the exception of consolidated COREP and FINREP reporting. The ECB's formal direct supervision applies to the domestically systemically important DZ BANK, apoBank and Muenchener Hyp. The Bundesbank and BaFin supervise each local bank individually.

In our view, this regulatory fragmentation prevents considerable efficiency gains, as each local bank must maintain extensive regulatory reporting and back office functions. We consider that the absence of comprehensive direct group supervision also fails to fully accommodate GFG's operational cohesion. Each local bank must fulfil regulatory requirements, such as SREP and liquidity coverage ratios, individually, although the mutual support scheme and DZ BANK's central liquidity pooling ensure intragroup fungibility of capital and funding.

The ECB has increasingly turned its supervisory attention to less significant European institutions (of which GFG and SFG's local banks account for the vast majority) over the past couple of years. In the long term, we believe this could eventually result in GFG being increasingly subject to comprehensive supervisory provisions at a consolidated level.

Cost-cutting-driven mergers among local banks are likely to continue at a sustained pace, but at the same time we expect GFG to remain strongly committed to its costly decentralised structure as long as the benefits from the local franchises prevail. GFG's decentralised setup also has positive risk implications as it limits risk correlations, drives granularity and promotes a cautious risk culture locally.

The continuous development of BVR's monitoring tools enables increasingly effective checks and balances. BVR's responsibilities notably include GFG's risk monitoring, the coordination of product development by the group's specialised product providers, and the management of the dual mutual support scheme.



#### **Risk Profile**

#### Risk Management Decentralised but Adequate Risk Controls

Each local bank defines its risk appetite independently and underwriting decisions are not subject to GFG-wide centralised approvals or limits. However, BVR's monitoring system indirectly influences the banks' risk-taking, because their individual contributions to GFG's mutual support fund BVR-Sicherungseinrichtung (BVR-SE) depend on BVR-SE's assessment of each bank's risk profile. The BVR will propose to its members changes to the statues of the group's IPS during its annual meeting in June 2023. The proposed changes aim to discipline members' risk appetite and increase the IPS's tools and speed of intervention.

The local banks also use a shared internal credit rating system for retail and SME loans and a synthetic risk-diversification tool, both managed by BVR and DZ BANK. The local banks' typically low risk appetite and their diversified and granular exposures adequately mitigate GFG's credit risk. The banks' strong focus on owner-occupied housing loans, which account for over one third of GFG's total loans, as well as their good knowledge of their local areas of operation and close client proximity, are also important risk-mitigating factors.

#### High Structural Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Books

The banking books of GFG's local banks are exposed to high and mostly unhedged structural interest-rate risk due to their asset/liability duration mismatches and a high share of fixed-rate lending.

Similar to SFG, a majority of cooperative banks have not hedged their securities portfolios against rising interest rates. The increase in euro interest rates accounted for the vast majority of the EUR4.5 billion valuation losses reported by the local cooperative banks under German GAAP in 2022. In the long term, we believe that virtually all valuation losses will gradually be reversed by the pull-to-par effect. This is because the cooperative banks' strong liquidity and large retail deposit base make fire sales of securities holdings highly unlikely, allowing for securities to be held to maturity. Moreover, only a negligible portion of bonds was bought above par. We also expect valuation losses triggered by widening credit spreads, as well as actual losses driven by bond issuers' defaults, to be low, due to the predominantly high quality of the banks' securities portfolios.

To limit the impact of their securities holdings' decreasing market values on their profits, the local banks reclassified some of their holdings from their marked to market liquidity portfolios to their held-to-collect securities investment portfolios under local GAAP during 2022.

GFG's insurance segment headed by DZ BANK's subsidiary R+V Versicherung AG, also reported a loss in 2022 driven by interest-rate-induced fair-value losses in its liquidity portfolio.



#### **Financial Profile**

#### **Asset Quality**


GFG's asset quality remained sound in 2022. Its focus on domestic lending is rating positive given the size and strength of the German economy. Its loan quality also benefits from a dominant focus on granular retail housing, small SMEs and professionals, high collateralisation levels in secured lending, and low single-name and sector concentrations.

The local banks' coverage of impaired loans is lower than international peers', but has remained stable in recent years and should be assessed in the context of the local banks' large proportion of retail mortgage loans. Including collateral, total coverage is reasonably close to 100%. Low unemployment and long fixed-rate maturities in the local banks' mortgage loan books will also protect their loan books from rising interest rates for the next few years.


GFG's corporate and SME portfolio is less sensitive to the high energy prices than domestic peers with larger exposures to the manufacturing sector. However, we expect impaired loans to rise moderately in 2023 and 2024, in line with corporate insolvencies in Germany increasing again after their record lows during the pandemic. GFG's exposure to CRE is mostly concentrated at DZ BANK's subsidiary DZ HYP AG, and at Muenchner Hyp, two of Germany's leading CRE lenders. The combined CRE loan volume is around EUR60 billion, with the majority backed by residential and office properties in Germany. The local banks' CRE exposure includes a large portion of SME loans secured with commercial property and apartment buildings. Predominantly long-term interest-rate fixes and adequate loan/value ratios should protect GFG's CRE loan books from rising refinancing risks and falling market valuations.

DZ BANK's asset quality benefits from conservative underwriting, risk diversification and years of run-down of the bank's shipping portfolio. DZ BANK's net direct exposure to Russia, Belarus and Ukraine is minimal, at about EUR139 million.

#### Loan Impairment Charges/Average Gross Loans



#### Operating Profit/Risk-Weighted Assets



#### **Earnings and Profitability**

GFG, together with the savings banks, has been the most profitable and resilient large German banking group by a wide margin over the past decade. The very high diversification of its business model results in stable earnings through the cycle.

In recent years, the group was able to offset the pressure on its net interest margins by growing its real estate loan book at a higher rate than peers and by also growing its asset-management business. This has increased the proportion of net commission income in GFG's revenue mix. We estimate that GFG's operating profit/RWAs fell to 0.6% in 2022 (2021: 1.4%), driven by the sizeable temporary valuation losses in the bond portfolios of the subsidiaries of the local banks and DZ BANK. This has more than offset a strong improvement in net interest margin on new business on the back of higher interest rates and extremely slow repricing of retail deposits.

Higher loan-impairment charges, only modest loan growth and cost inflation are likely to weigh on profitability in 2023. We expect higher interest rates to continue sustaining net interest income, but the repricing of the loan book will be only gradual, and demand for new housing loans, which drove loan growth in the past decade, is likely to continue declining in 2023 and remain low in 2024. Net commission income is also likely to remain flat as savings accounts increase in popularity again as interest rates rise and in the volatile market environment, thus reducing income from asset-management products.

#### **Capital and Leverage**

GFG's capitalisation and leverage are strong by international standards. Our assessment of the group's capitalisation considers the standardised approach used by GFG's local banks to measure credit risk for all asset classes. We believe




the use of the standardised approach considerably overstates the riskiness of GFG's balance sheet compared with similar European peers, which mostly use the internal-rating-based approach.

Paid-in capital accounts for only 12% of the group's IFRS equity, which predominantly consists of retained earnings accumulated during the group's long and steady record of strong organic capital generation, with a payout ratio of below 10% of GFG's net income.


GFG changed its consolidated regulatory capital reporting to IFRS from local GAAP in 2021, which resulted in yoy increases in the CET1 and leverage ratios at end-2021. We estimate that both ratios remained broadly unchanged at end-2022, as sustained loan growth at the local cooperative banks in 2022 (+6.5% yoy) should have offset profit retention and lower RWAs at DZ BANK.

Losses in DZ BANK's insurance subsidiary's bond portfolio booked at fair value through other comprehensive income resulted in a decline in DZ BANK's CET1 ratio to 13.7% at end-2022 (end-2021: 15.3%) after falling to 12.01% at end-3Q22. In 2023 DZ BANK's CET1 ratio will benefit from the implementation of IFRS 17 at its insurance subsidiary, which should result in a CET1 ratio well above 14%. DZ BANK also announced it will strengthen its Tier 1 capital by issuing AT1 instruments to other members of GFG in 2023.

#### **CET1 Ratio**



#### **Gross Loans/Customer Deposits**



#### **Funding and Liquidity**

The local banks are predominantly funded by granular domestic retail deposits. GFG has demonstrated the above-average stickiness of its deposit base through various interest-rate cycles by marginally increasing its deposit market shares (the second-largest in Germany behind SFG), fending off aggressive competitors during phases of higher interest rates and steeper yield curves, when competition for cheap retail deposits is particularly strong. Moreover, the local cooperative banks are perceived as safe havens during periods of banking sector turmoil.

GFG meets the majority of its external wholesale funding needs with covered bonds. Its members (mainly its mortgage lenders DZ HYP and Muenchener Hyp) are collectively, and by a wide margin, the largest issuers of German covered bonds, with EUR76 billion outstanding at end-2022. However, a material share of this aggregated volume is placed within GFG. Structural subordination of senior unsecured creditors is high at GFG's large covered bond issuing entities but moderate at the group's level, with only 5% of GFG's total assets encumbered by covered bonds. We do not view structural subordination at individual members as meaningful given the mutual support scheme, which protects their viability.

DZ BANK pools the local banks' excess deposits in its capacity as GFG's central institution, and some of its subsidiaries (especially its housing lender Bausparkasse Schwaebisch Hall) are large deposit-takers. Therefore, its wholesale funding needs are limited relative to its size, even though it is a frequent issuer of unsecured debt. DZ BANK places a significant share of its senior unsecured debt at GFG's local banks. Most of its external unsecured issuance is in the form of small private placements, often as reverse enquiries, to a diversified pool of international investors. This limits the bank's exposure to funding market volatility.

The local banks and DZ BANK have large liquidity portfolios, held in cash or invested in adequately diversified investment-grade bonds. In addition, local banks also run held to collect investment portfolios. However, we believe that a sale of bonds, both in the liquidity and investment portfolios, is very unlikely given the superior stability of the group's funding. GFG's members had already repaid about half of their outstanding central bank tenders (TLTRO) at end-2022.

#### **Additional Notes on Charts**

The forecasts in the charts in this section reflect Fitch's forward view on the bank's core financial metrics per Fitch's Bank Rating Criteria. They are based on a combination of Fitch's macro-economic forecasts, outlook at the sector level



and company-specific considerations. As a result, Fitch's forecasts may materially differ from the guidance provided by the rated entity to the market.

To the extent Fitch is aware of material non-public information with respect to future events, such as planned recapitalisations or merger and acquisition activity, Fitch will not reflect these non-public future events in its published forecasts. However, where relevant, such information is considered by Fitch as part of the rating process.

Black dashed lines represent indicative quantitative ranges and implied scores for Fitch's core financial metrics for banks operating in the environments that Fitch scores in the 'aa' category. Light-blue columns represent Fitch's forecasts.

Peer average includes Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (Sparkassen) (VR: a+), Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thueringen (a+), Desjardins Group (aa-), Groupe BPCE (a+), Credit Mutuel Alliance Federale (a+), Svenska Handelsbanken AB (aa), Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) (aa-), Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. (a+).



# **Financials**

## **Financial Statements**

	31 Dec 2	21	31 Dec 20	31 Dec 19	31 Dec 1
	(USDm)	(EURm)	(EURm)	(EURm)	(EURm
Summary income statement	·	·	·	·	
Net interest and dividend income	20,620 18,232		18,272	18,185	18,36
Net fees and commissions	9,811	8,675	7,439	7,092	6,81
Other operating income	1,821	1,610	1,709	3,665	81
Total operating income	32,253	28,517	27,420	28,942	26,00
Operating costs	21,011	18,577	18,036	18,142	18,07
Pre-impairment operating profit	11,242	9,940	9,384	10,800	7,92
Loan and other impairment charges	-381	-337	2,327	832	15
Operating profit	11,623	10,277	7,057	9,968	7,77
Other non-operating items (net)	277	245	159	211	n.a
Тах	3,412	3,017	2,189	3,133	2,36
Net income	8,488	7,505	5,027	7,046	5,40
Other comprehensive income	150	133	377	1,055	-45
Fitch comprehensive income	8,639	7,638	5,404	8,101	4,94
Summary balance sheet		<u> </u>		<u> </u>	
Assets					
Gross loans	1,067,696	944,028	890,576	844,552	794,91
Loan loss allowances	10,371	9,170	9,830	9,119	8,98
Net loans	1,057,325	934,858	880,746	835,433	785,92
Interbank	17,863	15,794	19,651	22,439	18,80
Derivatives	22,275	19,695	29,443	25,232	20,53
Other securities and earning assets	465,798	411,846	399,375	390,104	371,55
Total earning assets	1,563,261	1,382,193	1,329,215	1,273,208	1,196,81
Cash and due from banks	177,537	156,973	120,961	87,421	75,16
Other assets	30,859	27,285	25,715	23,459	21,19
Total assets	1,771,657	1,566,451	1,475,891	1,384,088	1,293,17
Liabilities					
Customer deposits	1,113,952	984,926	937,876	880,398	842,42
Interbank and other short-term funding	234,153	207,032	170,802	156,316	119,30
Other long-term funding	87,404	77,280	75,071	46,793	58,67
Trading liabilities and derivatives	24,805	21,932	32,589	54,896	48,74
Total funding and derivatives	1,460,314	1,291,170	1,216,338	1,138,403	1,069,13
Other liabilities	164,809	145,720	137,725	129,525	116,16
Preference shares and hybrid capital	199	176	246	204	24
Total equity	146,334	129,385	121,582	115,956	107,63
Total liabilities and equity	1,771,657	1,566,451	1,475,891	1,384,088	1,293,17
Exchange rate		USD1 = EUR0.884173	USD1 = EUR0.821963	USD1 = EUR0.89015	USD1 EUR0.87305



# **Key Ratios**

	31 Dec 21	31 Dec 20	31 Dec 19	31 Dec 18
Profitability				
Operating profit/risk-weighted assets	1.4	1.0	1.5	1.2
Net interest income/average earning assets	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5
Non-interest expense/gross revenue	65.1	65.8	63.2	69.9
Net income/average equity	6.0	4.2	6.3	5.1
Asset quality			·	
Growth in gross loans	6.0	5.5	6.2	4.3
Loan impairment charges/average gross loans	-0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0
Capitalisation			·	
Common equity Tier 1 ratio	15.1	14.4	13.6	13.5
Tangible common equity/tangible assets	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.3
Basel leverage ratio	8.0	7.5	7.0	6.9
Funding and liquidity				
Gross loans/customer deposits	95.9	95.0	95.9	94.4
Liquidity coverage ratio	160.1	177.6	174.3	166.0
Customer deposits/total non-equity funding	77.4	78.9	79.0	80.5



# **Support Assessment**

Commercial Banks: Government Suppo	π			
Typical D-SIB GSR for sovereign's rating level				
(assuming high propensity)	A+ to A-			
Actual jurisdiction D-SIB GSR	ns			
Government Support Rating	ns			
Government ability to support D-SIBs				
Sovereign Rating	AAA/ Stable			
Size of banking system	Negative			
Structure of banking system	Neutral			
Sovereign financial flexibility (for rating level)	Positive			
Sovereign infancial nexibility (for rating level)	Positive			
Sovereign milancial nexionity (101 rating level)	Positive			
Government propensity to support D-SIBs	Positive			
	Negative			
Government propensity to support D-SIBs				
Government propensity to support D-SIBs  Resolution legislation	Negative			
Government propensity to support D-SIBs  Resolution legislation	Negative			
Government propensity to support D-SIBs  Resolution legislation  Support stance	Negative			
Government propensity to support D-SIBs  Resolution legislation  Support stance  Government propensity to support bank	Negative Negative			

GFG's Government Support Rating (GSR) of 'no support' reflects our view that extraordinary sovereign support for EU banks is possible but cannot be relied on due to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism's resolution tools and mechanisms. It is likely that senior creditors will be required to participate in losses, if necessary, instead of, or ahead of, the group receiving sovereign support.

Banks



# **Subsidiaries and Affiliates**

DZ BANK's subsidiaries' issuer and debt ratings are sensitive to a change in DZ BANK's issuer or debt ratings.

# **Environmental, Social and Governance Considerations**

#### **Fitch**Ratings Genossenschaftliche FinanzGruppe Ratings Navigator Credit-Relevant ESG Derivation ssenschaftliche FinanzGruppe has 5 ESG potential rating drivers 0 key driver issues Genossenschaftliche FinanzGruppe has exposure to compliance risks including fair lending practices, mis-selling, repossession/foreclosure practices, consumer data protection (data security) but this has very low impact on the rating. Governance is minimally relevant to the rating and is not currently a driver 5 issues potential driver issues 2 not a rating driver issues

Environmental (E)					
General Issues	E Score	e Sector-Specific Issues	Reference	E Scale	
GHG Emissions & Air Quality	1	n.a.	n.a.	5	How to Read This Page ESG scores range from 1 to 5 based on a 15-level color gradation Red (5) is most relevant and green (1) is least relevant.
Energy Management	1	n.a.	n.a.	4	The Environmental (E), Social (S) and Governance (G) tables break out the individual components of the scale. The right-han box shows the aggregate E, S, or G score. General Issues ar relevant across all markets with Sector-Specific Issues unique to particular industry aroup. Scores are assigned to each sector
Water & Wastewater Management	1	n.a.	n.a.	3	particular intuitivity group. Scores are assigned to each set specific issue. These scores signify the credit-relevance of this sector-specific issues to the issuing entity's overall credit rating. The Reference box highlights the factor(s) within which the corresponding ESG issues are captured in Fitch's credit analysis.
Waste & Hazardous Materials Management; Ecological Impacts	1	n.a.	n.a.	2	The Credit-Relevant ESG Derivation table shows the overall ESG score. This score signifies the credit relevance of combined E, S and G issues to the entity's credit rating. The three columns to the left of the overall ESG score summarize the issuing entity's sub
Exposure to Environmental Impacts	2	Impact of extreme weather events on assets and/or operations and corresponding risk appetite & management; catastrophe risk; credit concentrations	Business Profile (incl. Management & governance); Risk Profile; Asset Quality	1	left of the overall ESG scores summarize the issuing entity's sub component ESG scores. The box on the far left identifies some o the main ESG issues that are drivers or potential drivers of the issuing entity's credit rating (corresponding with scores of 3, 4 or 5 and provides a brief explanation for the score.
Social (S)					Classification of ESG issues has been developed from Fitch's
General Issues	S Score	e Sector-Specific Issues	Reference	S Scale	sector ratings criteria. The General Issues and Sector-Specific Issues draw on the classification standards published by the United
Human Rights, Community Relations, Access & Affordability	2	Services for underbanked and underserved communities: SME and community development programs; financial literacy programs	Business Profile (incl. Management & governance); Risk Profile	5	Nations Principles for Responsible Investing (PRI) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB).
Customer Welfare - Fair Messaging, Privacy & Data Security	3	Compliance risks including fair lending practices, mis-selling, repossession/foreclosure practices, consumer data protection (data security)	Operating Environment; Business Profile (incl. Management & governance); Risk Profile	4	Sector references in the scale definitions below refer to Sector as displayed in the Sector Details box on page 1 of the navigator.
Labor Relations & Practices	2	Impact of labor negotiations, including board/employee compensation and composition	Business Profile (incl. Management & governance)	3	
Employee Wellbeing	1	n.a.	n.a.	2	
Exposure to Social Impacts	2	Shift in social or consumer preferences as a result of an institution's social positions, or social and/or political disapproval of core banking practices	Business Profile (incl. Management & governance); Financial Profile	1	
Governance (G)					CREDIT-RELEVANT ESG SCALE
General Issues	G Scor	e Sector-Specific Issues	Reference	G Scale	How relevant are E, S and G issues to the overall credit rating?
					Highly relevant, a key rating driver that has a

Governance (G)					CREDIT-RELEVANT ESG SCALE			
General Issues	G Score	Sector-Specific Issues	Reference	G S	Scale	How relevant are E, S and G issues to the overall credit rating?		
Management Strategy	3	Operational implementation of strategy	Business Profile (incl. Management & governance)	5		5		Highly relevant, a key rating driver that has a significant impact on the rating on an individual basis. Equivalent to "higher" relative importance within Navigator.
Governance Structure	3		Business Profile (incl. Management & governance); Earnings & Profitability; Capitalisation & Leverage	4		4		Relevant to rating, not a key rating driver but has an impact on the rating in combination with other factors. Equivalent to "moderate" relative importance within Navigator.
Group Structure	3	Organizational structure; appropriateness relative to business model; opacity, intra-group dynamics; ownership	Business Profile (incl. Management & governance)	3		3		Minimally relevant to rating, either very low impact or actively managed in a way that results in no impact on the entity rating. Equivalent to "lower" relative importance within Navigator.
Financial Transparency	3	Quality and frequency of financial reporting and auditing processes	Business Profile (incl. Management & governance)	2		2		Irrelevant to the entity rating but relevant to the sector.
				1		1		Irrelevant to the entity rating and irrelevant to the sector.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the entity. For more information on Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores, visit www.fitchratings.com/esg



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